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Abstract This article attempts to investigate the issue of asymmetries in the trans-
mission of shocks to input prices and exchange rate onto the wholesale and retail price
of gasoline respectively. For this purpose, we utilise the error-correction methodology
in the Greek gasoline market. The sample consists of monthly data covering the period
of January 1988 to June 2006. We also try to analyse by using impulse response func-
tions the effect of competition on the dynamic adjustment of gasoline price to which
has been paid scant attention in the past. The results favour the common perception
that retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases both
in the long and the short-run. At the wholesale segment, there is a symmetric response
of the spot prices of gasoline towards the adjustment to the short-run responses of
the exchange rate. Lastly, after the deregulation, wholesale prices of gasoline tend to
gradually restore equilibrium triggered by a price shock compared to the regulated
period.
Keywords Asymmetries · Gasoline market · Impulse response functions ·
Competition · Deregulation
JEL Classification D40 · L11 · C51 · C22
1 Introduction and survey of the literature
This article has two objectives. Firstly, we explore whether asymmetric pricing can be
identified in the Greek gasoline market by utilising error correction methodology on
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the monthly price changes. Despite its crucial importance due to the recent oil price
hikes, this analysis has not yet been done for Greece. Secondly, we try to analyze the
level of competition in the oil market in Greece to which has been paid rather scant
attention by the earlier studies. This kind of analysis tries to make the contribution
in this article more significant and novel. Besides, an understanding of the Greek
experience will be useful for countries that pursue strategies of sectoral deregulation
especially in the strategic sectors of their economy such as electricity, natural gas,
water, and telecommunications.
Within the last years there is a substantial body of literature investigating the exis-
tence of price asymmetry in the gasoline market. In these studies, there is a wide
diversification concerning one or more of the following aspects: the country under
examination, the time frequency of the period of the data used, the stage of the trans-
mission mechanism (retail or wholesale) and the econometric model employed in the
empirical investigation. For a good survey of asymmetric adjustment literature, see
Frey and Manera (2007). Table 1 reports the main empirical papers.
The majority of these studies apply cointegration techniques and especially Engle–
Granger methodology by utilising an asymmetric error-correction model in order to
discover the existence of price asymmetries. More specifically, Kirchgässner and
Kübler (1992), used an error correction model to investigate possible price asym-
metries in the wholesale and retail gasoline and heating oil markets in Germany for
the period 1972–1989. Their results differ according to the relevant time period. More
specifically, for the 1980s, the authors find rapid symmetric and full adjustment of
the retail prices to the spot prices (Rotterdam prices), whereas there is considerable
short-run asymmetry in the 1970s.
A different approach is followed in the pioneering study of Bacon (1991) who uses
a quadratic quantity adjustment function to estimate the existence of price asymme-
tries in wholesale and retail gasoline market in the United Kingdom respectively. In
this study, bi-weekly data are used for the period 1982–1989. According to the main
findings, the upward adjustment process is slightly faster than price reductions and the
period of adjustment more concentrated than was the case when costs fell. Moreover,
changes in the exchange rate necessitate 2 extra weeks relative to product prices before
being incorporated in the retail gasoline prices.
Most of the studies under scrutiny primarily focus on prices asymmetries and few
of them allow for other asymmetries. The paper by Galeotti et al. (2003) re-exam-
ines the issue of asymmetries in the retail market of gasoline by allowing possibly
asymmetric role of the exchange rate. In their stimulating paper the issue of asym-
metric pricing on specific European countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain) is
examined by using an error-correction model and bootstrapping techniques in order
to overcome the low-power problem of conventional testing procedures. In contrast to
several previous findings, the results generally point to widespread differences in both
adjustment speeds and short-run responses on prices and exchange rate when input
prices are volatile.
In order to assess the issue of asymmetric gasoline pricing, a small number of stud-
ies use daily data (Asplund et al. 2000; Bachmeier and Griffin (2003); Johnson 2002)
for a number of countries (Sweden, United Kingdom and United States).
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Competition and price asymmetries in the Greek 793
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 a detailed overview
of the oil market in Greece is provided, together with a presentation of the level of
competition in the three relevant markets (refining wholesale and retail market). Sec-
tion 3 offers a detailed description of the empirical model and the data used, while
Sect. 4 reports our estimation results. Finally, Sect. 5 encapsulates the main results of
this article presented together with some policy implications.
2 The oil sector in Greece
2.1 Market description
In contrast to many European countries (Germany, France, United Kingdom, etc) oil
sector in Greece is oriented into three distinct relevant markets (refining wholesale
and retail market).
In the refining market, there are only two companies (Hellenic Petroleum S.A. and
Motor Oil Hellas S.A.) that cover the 90% of the oil demand in Greece while the rest is
imported from the wholesale companies (Fig. 1). Refiners may sell gasoline and other
petroleum products (diesel, heating oil) directly to “large final consumers” such as
trucking firms, industrial manufacturers and utilities or to independent retailers (non-
branded petrol stations). However, the majority of refiner’s gasoline sales are made to
oil companies (wholesalers).
In the Greek wholesale segment, oil companies are legally separated from refin-
ing operations and are allowed to import and export oil products and sell them to
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Fig. 1 Structure of Greek oil sector in Greece
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Table 2 Market shares (%) in petroleum products, CR-4, and HHI in Greece (2000–2005)




EKO 18.02 19.25 18.75 19.01 17.60 17.30 −0.8
BP 21.09 19.80 18.76 18.55 18.50 17.10 −4.1
SHELL 12.01 15.44 15.52 15.91 15.50 15.50 5.2
AVINOIL 8.07 9.76 9.46 9.24 8.60 8.50 1.0
JETOIL 7.18 7.29 8.17 7.20 7.50 7.60 1.1
AIGAION OIL 1.52 2.88 3.48 3.94 5.00 6.00 31.6
ELINOIL 4.42 4.65 5.05 5.16 4.70 5.00 2.5
REVOIL 2.45 3.00 3.13 3.38 3.80 4.20 11.4
SILK OIL 2.73 2.99 3.05 3.21 3.40 3.50 5.1
ETEKA 2.01 2.18 2.39 2.64 3.10 3.40 11.1
DRACOIL 2.38 2.48 2.53 2.71 2.60 2.40 0.2
CYCLON 1.29 1.54 1.59 1.57 1.70 1.90 8.1
OTHERS 16.83 8.74 8.12 7.48 8.00 7.60 −14.7
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 –
CR-4 59.19 64.25 62.49 62.71 60.20 58.40 –
HHI 1132 1226 1185 1189 112 1086 –
The ranking of the market shares concerns the year 2005
Source: Bikos (2004) for the period 2000–2003 and Industry and Energy Magazine, May 2006 for the years
2004–2005
companies (oil companies and large final consumers such as electricity and aviation
companies) are allowed to import oil products directly provided that they can meet
the 90-day stockholding obligations. In terms of market power, EKO followed by
BP and SHELL (Table 2) are the three market leaders with a totally market share of
50% (2005). The next largest player is AVINOIL (8.5%), followed by JETOIL (7.6%),
AIGAION OIL (6.0%) and ELINOIL (5.0%), while the rest holds ∼23% of the whole-
sale segment. Each company sells its products (gasoline, diesel and heating oil) through
branded filling stations.
In Greece, there is a relatively large number of petrol filling stations compared to
the population. It is estimated that seven filling stations correspond to ten thousand
residents, while in Germany for example the proportion is only two stations per ten
thousand habitants. More specifically, there are ∼8.500 petrol filling station operators
(nearly 600 are unbranded) that cover the increasing demand for oil products. The
majority of them are company owned dealer operated (CODO) or dealer owned dealer
operated (DODO).The majority of petrol stations is situated close to the Attica region
and represents half of the total turnover of the retail market. Apart from filling station
operators, there is a small number of traders (so called “resellers”) that usually sell
directly to the final consumers heating oil and kerosene.
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To sum up, several different entities are involved in the pricing of gasoline (and
other petroleum products) at the downstream level. When gasoline is sold from the
refinery to the oil company, the price for this transaction is called the producer price
or ex-refinery price. The price charged for gasoline by the refiner or the oil company
to the independent and branded petrol stations respectively is called the wholesale
price. Finally, the price the petrol station charges the consumer is called the retail
price.1
2.2 Competition intensity in the relevant markets
The Greek oil market was deregulated in 1992 and competition has evolved in all of
the three segments. During the regulated period, the government retained the exclusive
right to set the prices in all of the relevant market (refining wholesale and retail prices).
In addition, the Greek government had the sole responsibility for the supply of crude
oil and the provision of the domestic market with petroleum products. The government
not only determined the logistic scheme of the oil companies (i.e. 70% of the domestic
market was covered from the refineries of the Public Oil Corporation, later known as
Hellenic Petroleum S.A. and the rest 30% from the other two private refineries) but
totally controlled the ex-refinery price, the profit margins of the oil companies and the
petrol station owners and the wholesale and retail price of the petroleum products. As
a result, oil companies, were only active in the wholesale segment in contrast to other
European countries that play significant role in all of the relevant markets of the oil
industry (from refining to retailing).
However, with the law 2008/1992, oil market was deregulated and petroleum prod-
uct prices have been set freely in all of the market segments. More specifically, Hellenic
Petroleum S.A. announces daily the ex-refinery prices to the next level of oil indus-
try (wholesalers) and the other private refineries (now only Motor Oil S.A.) charge
similar prices providing volume discounts to their customers (oil companies, large
final consumers). Each oil company is free to set its prices and the profit margins,
while petrol station owners set their retail prices and the profit margins according to
local competition and the level of their cost (fixed and variable cost). Although gas-
oline and oil prices have been set freely in the market since 1992, the government
retains the right to set price ceiling if it considers that the market is not functioning
well.2
Deregulation changed the level of “competition” in the Greek oil industry in several
ways. Oil companies tried to differentiate their marketing strategy by giving emphasis
on the quality and the specific ingredients of their products (gasoline, diesel oil, heating
1 The differences between prices at various levels in the marketing chain are called “margins”. Therefore,
the difference between the retail and wholesale price is called the wholesale-retail margin. The differ-
ence between the wholesale price and producer price is called producer–wholesale margin and the overall
difference is called producer–retail margin (Karrenbrock 1991).
2 The Ministry of Development that monitors the oil market in Greece has used the above mechanism for
specific prefectures (Thesprotia, Arta, Ioannina, Cyclades, etc) in 2003. However, the measure did not have
the anticipated results (RAE 2004).
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Fig. 2 Market concentration in the wholesale oil segment in Greece. Source: Author’s estimations
oil, etc.) such as additives.3 Their efforts focus on the establishment of a strong brand
name and high level of customer loyalty. Their strategy relies upon the advertisement
and the high quality service to their customers by offering gifts and other benefits.
Therefore in order to raise the level of their sales, oil companies provide several ben-
efits through their petrol stations network (i.e. car washing, dishes, toys, plates and
glasses, music CD’s, loyalty cards, etc). Usually the gift is connected to a minimum
specified quantity of a fuel that customer must buy (Bikos 2004).
As a result, after the regulated period, competition in the oil industry and especially
in the wholesale segment is not restricted only to the price level but has expanded in
other market areas as well (advertisement, quality and brand names, appearance and
good service of the petrol stations, benefits, gifts, etc).
Deregulation has also changed the level of market concentration in the wholesale
and retail segment of the oil industry. As far as the wholesale market is concerned, it
has to be mentioned that after 1992, the level of market concentration has been affected
by the regulatory changes. The market share that claimed the four major oil compa-
nies in 1995 (CR-4 index) was estimated in 61.5%, while in 2005 the four leading
companies possessed the 67.3% of the total sales of gasoline (Fig. 2). Also the first
eight oil companies possessed the 81.9% of the market in 1995 (CR-8 index) while in
2005 claimed the 85.0% of the total sales of gasoline. It is interesting to highlight that
within the last decade, the concentration of the market has shown a steady increase
due to mergers and acquisitions. The Hirschman–Herfindahl index (HHI) has shown a
slow decrease reaching the level of 1086 in 2005 compared to 1106 in 1995 (−1.8%).
3 In order to distinguish the quality of their products and focus on the brand name, major oil companies
like BP, SHELL and EKO sell their products by giving them different names such as “Ultimate”, V-power”
and “Kinitron”, respectively.
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In the retail segment, there is a steady increase in the number of petrol stations
since the deregulation. This is mainly attributed to the relatively high profit margins
of the retailers in contrast to other European countries.
Despite the existence of the deregulation in the oil industry, competition in the
other segments of the market except for retailing is still limited. The following analy-
sis will try to highlight the main distortions of competition in the three distinct relevant
markets.
In the refining segment, apart from significant barriers to entry that favour the
incumbent firms (i.e. sunk cost, economies of scope and scale, legal restrictions, etc)
there are also potential problems hindering the level of competition. The major prob-
lem is connected to the existing strategic stockholding obligation system.4 Due to
specific restrictions (i.e. lack of storage, strict environmental legislation, bureaucracy,
system of compulsory oil reserves in the Greek territory) a marketer (oil company,
end-user) cannot easily import oil products.
The low magnitude of oil imports is accelerated from the absence of third-party
access regulation, since if a marketer wants to import oil products must rent space
from refineries in order to comply with the 90-day obligation following a commercial
agreement and paying a negotiated third-party access tariff. As a result, and due to the
above-mentioned reasons, imports in Greece are still limited.
In the wholesale market, entry is not restrained by significant technical, legal or
economic barriers to entry. Provided that a company has the relevant magnitude and
the necessary level of infrastructure (i.e. investment capital, collaboration with oil
suppliers, distribution network, and stockholding capacity) can enter the market and
compete with the incumbent firms.
In the retail segment competition is relatively strong. However, some problems
may occur and are the outcome of the existing legal framework. More specifically,
as a consequence of the existing legislation, hypermarkets, who can sell large quanti-
ties of gasoline with low cost (economies of scale), are not an active player in petrol
retailing unlike in other European countries (e.g. United Kingdom and France).5 As
a result, gasoline retail prices before taxes and duties are systematically above the
European average.
Another possible explanation for the price discrepancy is that petrol filling stations
in Greece have due to their number—in their vast majority—low sales compared to
other countries in the European Union. In order to cover their costs and not loose their
customers they have to increase the retail margins, which are higher in Greece than in
other European countries.
4 With the oil law 3054/2002 that came into force since 2003, any marketer (refineries, oil companies, large
industries) who wishes to import crude oil or final oil products (gasoline, diesel, heavy fuel oil, LPG, etc)
must keep stocks (within the Greek territory) equivalent to 90 days of the net imported quantity.
5 We must mention that in United Kingdom, supermarkets have grown continuously and significantly over
the last years, whereas their volumes have grown at the expense of the traditional road site filling stations
(OFT 1998).
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3 Empirical methodology
Following the specification of Bettendorf et al. (2003), Galeotti et al. (2003), Kaufmann
and Laskowski (2005), and Reilly and Witt (1998), various unrestricted error-correc-
tion models are used to link the relevant variables. In order to investigate the adjustment
path in the different relevant gasoline markets (wholesale, retail market), we estimate
two distinct asymmetric error-correction models that account for the wholesale and
retail market, respectively. By taking into account, the previous considerations, the
basic (long-run) relationships are the following:
SPGt = β0 + β1CRt + βa2EXRt + εt (1)
NRPGt = β0 + β1SPGt + εt (2)
The above equations represent the long-run relationships in the wholesale (Eq. 1) and
retail market, respectively (Eq. 2).6 The interpretation of the relevant variables comes
as follows: SPGt is the gasoline spot price at time t, NRPGt is the retail price of
unleaded gasoline net of taxes (excise tax and VAT) and duties at time t , CRt is the
price of crude oil, EXRt is the exchange rate between U.S. dollar and national currency
(drachmas), while finally εt stands for the disturbance term.
All prices are in their natural logarithms and expressed in drachmas per litre. The
reason for using nominal exchange rate in the wholesale model is related with the fact
that exchange rate may be a relevant source of asymmetry in non-US countries (Bacon
1991; Galeotti et al. 2003). More specifically, as stated by Galeotti et al. (2003), since
crude oil is paid for in dollars whereas gasoline sells for different sums of national
currencies, the exchange rate plays a significant, possibly asymmetric role.
The sample spans the period from January 1988 to June 2006 using an updated
monthly dataset which consists of 222 observations to carry out a thorough investiga-
tion of gasoline market in Greece. We have chosen this extended dataset (from 1988
until the most recent months) for at least two reasons. Firstly, we want to capture the
effect of deregulation on the oil market in Greece (1993 onwards) and try to link these
results with the level of competition in the gasoline market. Secondly, since there was a
legal change in the stockholding obligation in Greece (2003), it is interesting to check
how the changes in inventory regulation effect the adjustment of gasoline prices to
changes in the oil price.7
Energy prices (gasoline spot prices and crude oil prices) are taken from: (a) Inter-
national Energy Agency (IEA) and especially from various issues of “Energy Prices
and Taxes”8 and (b) USA Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration
6 Variables are in their natural logarithms.
7 In 2001, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) condemned Greece for the existing strategic stockholding
system that generated distortions in the competition of the oil industry (elimination of petroleum imports)
and raised serious restrictions to the vertically integration of the market segments. As a result a new oil law
(3054/2002) came into force in 2003.
8 More precisely, we use the Brent crude oil prices as important marker crude and the spot gasoline prices
as traded in Mediterranean, the major market for petroleum products in South-Eastern Europe. Spot price
variable is a good measure of input price (wholesale) for retailers in Greece since both the refiners and
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(EIA). However, pre-tax unleaded gasoline retail price (NRPG) is obtained directly
from the Oil Bulletin of the Directorate-General for Energy and Transport of the
European Commission.9 Data on the exchange rate between the national currency
(drachma) and the US dollar are obtained from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) for the period January 1988–December 2001. In January 2002, the Euro replaced
the national currency (drachma) in Greece, although they continued physically existing
until March of 2002.10
The asymmetry in the transmission of changes in input prices to output prices can
be accommodated within a dynamic model (Galeotti et al. 2003). In order to allow
for possible price and exchange rate asymmetries, we construct the following ECM
specifications:

















+λ−ECMNt−1 + εt (3)










+λ+ECMPt−1 + λ−ECMNt−1 + εt (4)
where  is the first difference operator. In the above asymmetric ECMs (wholesale
and retail), changes in the input prices (crude oil and spot prices) and fluctuations in
the exchange rate are split into positive and negative changes, respectively. In other
words as suggested by Galeotti et al. (2003), short-run asymmetry is captured by sim-
ilarly decomposing price and exchange rate changes into x+t = xt − xt−1 > 0 and
x−t = xt − xt−1 < 0 for x = CR, SPG, EXR. Hence, CRP = CR if CR > 0
and 0 otherwise. SPGP =  SPG if SPG > 0 and 0 otherwise and EXRP = 
EXR if EXR > 0 and 0 otherwise. The opposite holds for CRN, SPGN and
 EXRN. Finally ECMP and ECMN denote the one-period lagged deviation from
the long-run equilibrium (Eqs. 1, 2) and account for asymmetry in the adjustment
process. Similarly, ECMP = εt > 0 and 0 otherwise and ECMN = εt < 0 and 0
otherwise. The orders k, l, m, n represent the number of lagged terms for decreases
Footnote 8 continued
the oil companies (wholesalers) use the Platt’s quotations as a basis point price mechanism in the market.
Hence, the spot price in Mediterranean is an informative proxy for the wholesale gasoline price in Greece.
9 The bulletin reports weekly the average Monday’s pump price without taxes and duties in each member
state of the European Union.
10 In December 2000, the drachma/euro exchange rate was definitely fixed at 340.75 drachmas. Taking
into account this fixed exchange rate and that of Euro/dollar provided by the European Central Bank we
calculate the exchange rate drachma/dollar on each month for the period January 2002–June 2006 by using
the following formulation: drachma/dollar = 340.75×euro/dollar.
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and increases in the explanatory variables, respectively, and are chosen by using the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) so as to make εt white noise.
For the investigation of the order of integration, we have applied a series of diagnos-
tic tests both in levels and first differences of the variables (Augmented Dickey–Fuller,
Phillips–Perron and KPSS tests). The results of the above tests are presented in Table 3.
Applying the relevant tests, we observe that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot
be rejected at 5% critical value for all the relevant variables. In other words, all the
series are non-stationary in levels. However, they are integrated of order one, or I(1)
and do not include deterministic terms (trend and intercept).11
4 Empirical results
4.1 Long-run estimates
The next step is to examine if there is a cointegrated relationship between the non-
stationary variables of the models. For this purpose, we applied both the (augmented)
Dickey–Fuller test and the cointegrated Durbin Watson test (CRDW). From the empir-
ical results (see Table 4), we found that at the 5% level of significance the disturbance
term on each equation (wholesale and retail) is stationary or I(0). This means that,
according to the Granger representation theorem there is one cointegrating vector
which corresponds to long-run equilibrium between the non-stationary variables of
each model (Engle and Granger 1987). OLS estimation of long-run relationships yields
super consistent estimates of long-run responses of output prices to changes in input
prices (Eqs. 1, 2) and exchange rates (Eq. 1).
The estimation period for this study covers the somewhat volatile time of signifi-
cant oil price increases especially during the period 2003–2006. Hence, it is crucial
to check the cointegration relationships for the existence of structural breaks. For this
purpose we apply the Quandt–Andrews breakpoint test in order to capture possible
changes in the output prices (Stock and Watson 2003). The results indicate the exis-
tence of a structural break in wholesale and retail prices in the long-run (Tables 5, 6).
This means that in the long-run the pattern of gasoline output prices in Greece does
not remain unchanged during the estimated period.
We now turn to the estimates of the long-run coefficients (standard errors are in
parentheses)
SPG = 0.34 + 0.95CR + 0.56EXR + ε
(0.15) (0.01) (0.21) (5)
NRPG = 1.78 + 0.66SPG + ε
(0.06) (0.01) (6)
In the wholesale specification (Eq. 5), the estimated coefficient on CR is signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. The magnitude of the relevant
11 It has to be mentioned that there is a general agreement in the literature that gasoline and oil prices are
integrated of order one.
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Table 4 Tests for co-integration
Variables ADF test CRDW
Uspg −7.70∗∗ 1.83∗∗
Unrpg −3.32∗ 1.21∗∗
Uspg and Unrpg denote the error correction terms of spot and retail prices in the wholesale and retail equa-
tion, respectively. The t values reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration, indicating that the residuals
are I(0). The critical values for the ADF test are obtained by Manning (1991)
∗∗ Significance at the 1% level
∗ Significance at the 5% level
Table 5 Recursive estimates for the gasoline spot prices (1988:01–2006:6)
Statistic Value Prob.
Maximum LR F statistic (1993M07) 19.01908 0.0048
Maximum Wald F statistic (1993M07) 19.01908 0.0048
Exp LR F statistic 7.470198 0.0035
Exp Wald F statistic 7.470198 0.0035
Ave LR F statistic 11.76588 0.0012
Ave Wald F statistic 11.76588 0.0012
Quandt–Andrews unknown breakpoint test
Null hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data
Varying regressors: All equation variables
Equation sample: 1988M01 2006M06
Test sample: 1991M10 2002M09
Number of breaks compared: 132
Table 6 Recursive estimates for the gasoline retail prices (1988:01–2006:6)
Statistic Value Prob.
Maximum LR F statistic (1998M06) 138.5418 0.0000
Maximum Wald F statistic (1998M06) 138.5418 0.0000
Exp LR F statistic 65.86920 0.0000
Exp Wald F statistic 65.86920 0.0000
Ave LR F statistic 104.1999 1.0000
Ave Wald F statistic 104.1999 1.0000
Quandt–Andrews unknown breakpoint test
Null hypothesis: No breakpoints within trimmed data
Varying regressors: All equation variables
Equation sample: 1988M01 2006M06
Test sample: 1991M10 2002M09
Number of breaks compared: 132
coefficient means that a 1% increase of crude oil will lead to an increase of spot
price of gasoline by 0.95%. In other words in the long run, a change in the crude
oil price is fully passed to the wholesale price of gasoline.12 This implies that the
12 This finding is in alignment with other studies such as Contin et al. (2006).
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margin is independent of crude oil price. Fluctuations in the exchange rate do play a
significant role in the wholesale price formation. The relevant coefficient is positively
related to the spot price of gasoline and its magnitude equals 0.56. In other words, an
increase in the exchange rate (devaluation of drachma against the US dollar) will tend
to increase the spot price of gasoline whereas the reverse holds in case of a decrease
in the exchange rate (revaluation of drachma against the US dollar).
In the retail specification (Eq. 6), it is evident that all the coefficients are statistically
significant and have the anticipated signs. More specifically, the price effect (SPG) on
the net retail price of gasoline is positive and quite substantial in magnitude, with the
relevant coefficient bellow unity (0.66). This means that a 1% increase (decrease) of
gasoline spot price will lead to an increase (decrease) of the retail price—before taxes
and duties—of gasoline by 0.66%. Similarly to the wholesale specification, a change
in the gasoline spot price is fully passed through to the net retail price. The relatively
smaller pass-through price mechanism is due to the fact that as we are moving down
the oil supply chain, the price of upstream oil becomes a smaller portion of the cost
of the price of oil in the next stage (wholesale). Therefore, a change in the upstream
price of oil would generate a smaller price increase downstream (0.66%). Notice also
that the coefficient on SPG represents the combined effect of a change in the world
price of gasoline on the cost and on the mark up (Bettendorf et al. 2003).
4.2 Short-run estimates and asymmetries
4.2.1 Error-correction model estimates
In Table 7, are shown the results from the estimation of the two ECM’s referring to the
wholesale (first column) and retail level of gasoline (second column). Each coefficient
of the explanatory variables denotes the short-run response to the output prices (spot
and retail prices). In order to select the appropriate number of lags in the two ECM’s,
we try to minimise the AIC.
More specifically, the dynamic function referring to the Greek wholesale gaso-
line market (first stage) appears to be well behaved to the diagnostic tests including
the serial correlation (LM test), the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity test
(ARCH test) and the White test for heteroskedasticity. In order to test whether the
short-run regression is stable throughout the sample, we used recursive OLS tech-
niques having pre-described above (see long-run estimates). All tests do not reject the
null hypothesis of no split in the data. In other words, the estimated statistics support
the structural stability of the estimated regression for the examined period used in the
empirical analysis.
In the relevant table, the coefficients of the variables ECMP and ECMN indicate
asymmetric adjustment speeds, which is a measure of long-run asymmetry. In other
words as mentioned by Galeotti et al. (2003) the positive and negative ECM coeffi-
cients are associated with adjustment to the long-run equilibrium level of price from
above and from bellow. In contrast to, the coefficients of all other variables account
for short-run or transitory asymmetry.
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From the empirical results and the subsequent statistical tests (see Sect. 4.2.3) it
is obvious that positive coefficients are generally larger, in absolute value, than their
negative counterparts for both in the long-run and short-run responses. This finding
which is also evident in other empirical studies (Grosso and Manera 2007; Contin et al.
2006) reflects the consumers’ perception of the actual effects of oil price variations on
gasoline price changes at least in the short-run. This means that the effects of upstream
price increases are larger than those of price decreases.
Table 5 also reports the transmission of shocks in exchange rates to output prices.
On average over the estimation period, spot prices of gasoline register a well deter-
mined response to increases (or devaluations) in the drachma dollar exchange rate.
This means that in the wholesale level, only positive changes appear to be significant.
Our point estimate suggests that a 10% increase (or devaluation) in the drachma dol-
lar exchange rate, rendering imported crude oil more expensive in terms of drachma,
raises spot prices by ∼4%. This evidence suggests that refineries are generally reluc-
tant to transfer to consumers those price reductions which originate from favourable
movements in exchange rates (Grosso and Manera 2007).
Finally, the estimated autoregressive coefficients (positive and negative variations),
which enter the model when the lag-length is equal to or larger than one have positive
signs but fail to be statistically significant. Hence, they are not presented in the relevant
table.
We now turn our discussion into the examination of point estimates in the retail level
specification (column 2 in Table 5). In general terms, the dynamic equation fits to the
data quite well, with high adjusted R2 (0.67). The statistical tests reject the presence of
autocorrelation of first or higher order and heteroskedasticity as well as autoregressive
autocorrelation (ARCH effects). Finally according to the relevant statistics, no sign of
structural instability has been detected.
From the empirical results, we see that positive short-run price effect is larger than
its negative counterpart. This means that retail gasoline prices in Greece seem to react
more to price increases and to negative gaps to the equilibrium than to price decreases
and positive disequilibrium. This finding is also evident in other European countries
as well. From the magnitude of the relevant estimates, we see that a 10% short-run
increase in spot price of gasoline (wholesale price) will increase the retail price of
gasoline by about 3.3%. This outcome is intuitively valid, since crude oil, refining
costs and profit account for roughly 30% of retail costs, while taxes (excise taxes and
VAT) and wholesale margin account for another 70%. Next in column 2, we study
where the responsiveness of price is symmetric in decreases and increases of the spot
price of gasoline. A rise in spot price of gasoline (SPG) of one unit induces a con-
temporaneous retail price increase of about 0.33, whereas a fall in SPG of one unit,
results in a contemporaneous price effect of 0.27. Taken together this means that the
price responded more rapidly to cost increases than to decreases. However, from the
empirical interpretation, we conclude that a proportion of increases in SPG passed
through in the same period (month) as they occur, whereas a small part of increases in
SPG passed through in the previous month (point estimate of 0.23). Similarly, long-run
price adjustments to decreases in SPG are distributed over 2 months (pass through of
0.27 in the same month and of 0.38 in the previous month). From the above analysis,
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it is evident that the accumulated pass-through in the retail price of gasoline (NRPG)
is rather than symmetric.
If we try to compare the two-level analysis, some interesting remarks emerge. First,
the magnitude of short-run coefficients is in the most cases larger in the wholesale than
in the retail level. Second, the adjustment towards the equilibrium level is more gradual
in the retail level revealing the differences between the wholesale and retail market.
Furthermore, both the wholesalers and retailers tend to react more to price increases
than price decreases. However, from the relevant magnitude of the price coefficients
in the wholesale and the retail equations, we assume that retailers do not immediately
transfer onto final prices (pump prices) all the adjustments in the wholesale prices.
Instead changes are distributed over time (Grosso and Manera 2007). In other words,
wholesale price increases and decreases affect retail prices for 3 months, whereas
crude oil price variations (increases and decreases) affect the wholesale gasoline price
for only 2 months (the initial month plus a lagged month).
The comparison of results from 1988–1992, which correspond to the period of reg-
ulation and 1993–2006, which correspond to the period of deregulation, is very inter-
esting for understanding asymmetry and the role of government regulation. Besides,
by capturing the effect of regulation on gasoline prices we are able to relate the results
for 1988–1992 and 1993–2006 periods to the level of competition. This may provide
a link between the role of competition in the oil market and the level of asymmetry
(rockets and feathers hypothesis.13)
From the empirical results, of the first (“regulated”) period (1988:01–1992:12), we
can see that only positive changes of the error correction term affect significantly the
level of adjustment to long-run equilibrium (speed of adjustment equal to −0.29).
This means that if the spot price of gasoline is 10% above its long-run equilibrium
price, given the current crude price, the percentage change difference over a period of
1 month will be 0.10 × (−0.29) = −0.029 = 2.9% ceteris paribus. In other words,
in the case, we are off the long-run equilibrium, the spot gasoline price will reach
equilibrium in a 3 months period. The coefficients for the short-run crude oil positive
and negative variations are statistically significant and equal to 0.63 and 0.84, respec-
tively. Note also that exchange rate does not affect the estimated equation since the
coefficients are not statistically significant.
The results vary significantly if we estimate the short-run spot price equation for
the period after the regulation (1993:01–2006:06). More specifically, the speed of
adjustment concerning the positive variations of the long-run equilibrium is larger
in absolute value and equal to −0.45. This means that after the deregulation of the
oil market, departures from the long-run equilibrium do not appear so “permanent”
compared to the period prior to the opening of the market. Therefore, wholesale prices
of gasoline tend to gradually restore equilibrium after the existence of a price shock
(i.e. abrupt increase in the crude oil price). The coefficient of the short-run crude oil
positive variations is larger in value that its negative counterpart (0.86 compared to
0.78). However, as in the previous case, exchange rate does not affect the estimated
equation since the coefficients are not statistically significant
13 Rockets and feathers is a term used to describe price behaviour where it is sudden increase but decreases
at a much slower pace.
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As stated in the previous analysis, there was a change in regulation of inventory
behaviour in Greece in 2003. Hence, it is crucial to assess how the changes in the com-
pulsory stock obligation affect the adjustment (e.g. speed of response and the long-run
value) of gasoline prices to changes in oil price. In order to perform such analysis, we
estimate the wholesale equation (Eq. 1) by splitting the sample size into three distinct
sub-periods.
According to our results, in the first period (1988:01–2002:12), that covers the years
prior to the implementation of the new compulsory stockholding obligation (regulated
and unregulated period) that came into force in 2003, only positive changes of the error
correction term affect significantly the level of adjustment to long-run equilibrium.
More specifically, the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is estimated
to −0.35, which has the following interpretation. If the spot price of gasoline is 10%
above its long-run equilibrium price, given the current crude price, the percentage
change difference over a period of 1 month will be 0.10× (−0.35) = −0.035 = 3.5%
ceteris paribus.
If we estimate the model for the unregulated period with the old stockholding regime
(1993:01–2002:12) some interesting findings emerge. Firstly, we see that as in the pre-
vious period only positive changes of the error correction term affect significantly the
level of adjustment to long-run equilibrium. The speed of adjustment to the long-run
equilibrium is estimated to −0.44. This means that if the spot price of gasoline is
10% above its long-run equilibrium price, given the current crude price, 4.4% of the
difference between the equilibrium price and the current price will be eliminated in
the next month ceteris paribus. In addition, the coefficients for the short-run crude oil
positive and negative variations are statistically significant and equal to 0.80 and 0.81
respectively. It is interesting to highlight that within this period, negative short-run
price coefficient is slightly larger than its positive counterpart, while only positive
changes in the exchange rate play a significant role in the short-run variations of spot
gasoline price.
Lastly, if we estimate the wholesale model for the third period (2003:1–2006:6),
that covers the years after the deregulation with the new stockholding regime, we see
that the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is more gradual since the relevant coef-
ficient is estimated to −0.56. The coefficients for the short-run crude oil positive and
negative variations are statistically significant and equal to 1.03 and 0.74, respectively.
It is interesting to highlight that in the latter period, positive short-run price coefficient
is larger than its negative counterpart while the reverse holds for the former period.
To sum up, the above results do not change dramatically if we estimate the short-run
relations (Eqs. 3, 4) by using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS), as described in
Stock and Watson (1993).
4.2.2 Impulse response functions
Although the above analysis shows that there are short run relationships between the
variables of each model, it does not reveal the direction of their causal relationship.
An alternative way to obtain the information regarding the relationships among the
variables of the two relevant models is through the estimation of the impulse response
functions (IRF’s). The IRF’s can be interpreted as the response of price (spot and retial
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Response of ER to ER
Fig. 3 Impulse response functions for spot gasoline price. Source: Author’s calculations
price of gasoline) to a cost shock that pushes the system temporarily out of its long-run
equilibrium and illustrate the speed of gasoline price adjustment to the long-run values
estimated using Eqs. 1 and 2.
The IRF’s derived from the unrestricted VAR for spot price of gasoline are pre-
sented in Fig. 3. From the first row of the diagram, it is evident that the effect of one
standard deviation shock of the price of crude oil (CRUDE) on spot price of gasoline
(SGASOL) is positive and significant for a period of 5 months. Subsequently, the
confidence bounds become very wide, making the response of spot price of gasoline
to oil shocks fluctuations insignificant. The peak response of spot price of gasoline to
crude oil price innovations occurs 5 months after the initial shock, stabilizing there-
after. This means that an oil shock is rather than short-lived. This outcome reveals
crucial information regarding the transmission of upstream shocks (increase of crude
oil price) to downstream prices (wholesale and retail prices). As stated in Sect. 2.2,
the duopoly that exists in the refining sector in Greece has an important implication for
the wholesale market given the limited level of petroleum imports. The increasingly
rate of response of spot price of gasoline to crude oil shocks and the stabilization after
the first 5 months, gives an indication that a market power effect (running from the
refiners to wholesalers) holds in the spot gasoline price changes.
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Response of SGASOL to SGASOL
Fig. 4 Impulse response functions for retail gasoline price. Source: Author’s calculations
Moreover, the response of spot price of gasoline to a one standard deviation shock
of exchange rate (ER) is also found to be positive and statistical significant for the first
8 months, representing that a devaluation of drachma against the US dollar will tend to
increase the spot price of gasoline whereas the opposite holds in case of a revaluation.
The same pattern (positive relationship) follows the response of spot price of gasoline
to a standard deviation shock of exchange rate. Lastly, the response of spot price of
gasoline to its own innovations is found to be increasing for the first 2 months and
decreasing and not statistically significant for the subsequent period.
The IRF’s derived from the unrestricted VAR for retail price of gasoline are pre-
sented in Fig. 4. It is evident from the first row of the diagram, that the effect of
one standard deviation shock of spot price of gasoline on retail price (RPGASOL) is
positive and significant for almost a period of 3 months. Subsequently, the confidence
bounds become very wide, making the response of retail price of gasoline to wholesale
price fluctuations insignificant. It is crucial to mention that the positive relationship
between the two variables has also been detected in the cointegration analysis. In
addition, the response of spot price of gasoline to its retail price innovations is stable
across the whole period (12 months). Lastly, the response of retail price of gasoline
to its own innovations is positive with a decreasing rate during the simulated period.
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4.2.3 Price and exchange rate asymmetries
Having estimated the short-run responses of the output prices to input variations, we
focus on the gasoline price asymmetry hypothesis both in the wholesale and retail
level. Table 8 reports the calculated Wald tests testing the asymmetry hypothesis
in the wholesale and retail level. More specifically, rejection of the null hypothesis
Table 8 F tests of asymmetric responses












α+ = α− =




Wholesale level 12.15∗ [0.00] 0.079 [0.77] 0.57 [0.44] 2.49∗∗ [0.06]
1.75 [0.18] 0.23 [0.63] 0.37 [0.54] 250.94 [0.00]]
Retail level 4.44∗ [0.03] 5.12∗ [0.00] – –
0.46 [0.49] 0.012 [0.91]
(1988:01–1992:12) 60 observations
Wholesale level 3.56∗∗ [0.06] 0.41 [0.52] 0.01 [0.88] 0.29 [0.83]
1.50 [0.22] 0.59 [0.44] 0.18 [0.66] 55.98 [0.00]
Retail level 3.58∗ [0.02] 2.39∗∗ [0.06] – –
0.32 [0.57] 1.97 [0.16]
(1993:01–2006:06) 162 observations
Wholesale level 1.46 [0.22] 0.15 [0.69] 0.40 [0.52] 2.63∗∗ [0.05]
0.51 [0.47] 0.04 [0.83] 0.28 [0.59] 185.31 [0.00]
Retail level 1.08 [0.38] 3.68∗∗ [0.05] – –
0.002 [0.96] 1.83 [0.17]
(1988:01–2002:12) 180 observations
Wholesale level 8.69∗ [0.00] 0.26 [0.60] 1.79 [0.18] 1.86∗∗∗ [0.13]
2.70 [0.10] 0.31 [0.57] 1.69 [0.19] 224.81 [0.00]
Retail level 7.06∗ [0.00] 2.06∗∗ [0.06] – –
1.96 [0.16] 0.26 [0.60]
(1993:01–2002:12) 120 observations
Wholesale level 3.53∗∗∗ [0.06] 0.0005 [0.98] 2.40 [0.12] 2.18∗∗∗ [0.09]
1.19 [0.27] 0.0004 [0.98] 2.48 [0.11] 161.98 [0.00]
Retail level 0.03 [0.86] 4.67∗∗ [0.03] – –
0.68 [0.40] 0.39 [0.52]
(2003:01–2006:06) 42 observations
Wholesale level 6.44∗ [0.01] 0.29 [0.58] 1.23 [0.27] 1.98∗∗∗ [0.13]
0.025 [0.87] 0.053 [0.81] 1.31 [0.25] 27.62 [0.00]
Retail level 6.15∗ [0.01] 1.96∗∗∗ [0.16] – –
2.59 [0.10] 2.15 [0.14]
The coefficients in italics are estimated using dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS)
∗,∗∗, ∗∗∗ Significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. The numbers in square brackets are p values
123
812 M. L. Polemis
H0 : λ+ = λ− implies asymmetric long-run adjustment, whereas short-run asymme-
tries (price and exchange rate) arise when at least one of the hypotheses H0 : α+ = α−
or b+ = b−, is rejected. By using the relevant tests, we see that the hypothesis of sym-
metric adjustment speeds can be rejected at the wholesale and retail level as well.
This means that we have found evidence of an asymmetric response of the rate of
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. However, for the period after the dereg-
ulation (1993–2006), the null hypothesis λ+ = λ− in the wholesale and retail level
cannot be rejected (F = 1.46, p value = 0.22 F = 1.08, p value = 0.38, respectively).
In other words, there is a symmetric response of the rate of adjustment toward the
long-run equilibrium in all the segments of the gasoline market. Similar conclusion
can be traced in the paper of Contin et al. (2006).
From the combined results of the above-mentioned Wald-tests, we reach the con-
clusion that there is a symmetric response of the output prices of gasoline in the
wholesale level. This conclusion which can be found in other empirical studies as
well (Godby et al. 2000; Galeotti et al. 2003; Contin et al. 2006) runs contrary to
the common perception regarding the price asymmetries that emerge in the gasoline
market. Similar results can be traced when testing for exchange rate asymmetry in
the wholesale level. However, when we simultaneously test the equality of all short-
run parameters of the same lags in the wholesale level the null hypothesis (equality
hypothesis) is rejected in all sub-periods except for the period of regulation (F = 0.29,
p value = 0.83). Despite the fact that no sign of price asymmetry is detected in the
wholesale level, we must mention that there is a tendency to over-reject the null
hypothesis of symmetry due to the low power of standard F statistics (Galeotti et al.
2003). However, when we test for price asymmetries in the retail segment of the
market, the null hypothesis is rejected for all the periods of estimation suggesting
the existence of asymmetric retail price responses to changes in the spot (wholesale)
price.
Although the OLS estimate of the cointegrating vector is superconsistent, it will
contain a small-sample bias and the limiting distribution is non normal with a non-
zero mean (Stock 1987). A bias in the estimate for the cointegrating vector will affect
the cointegrating residual, which is an independent variable in the error correction
model (Eqs. 3, 4). To test for the potential effect of this bias and the robustness
of the econometric results, we estimate cointegrated relationships (Eqs. 1, 2) using
DOLS.
We chose DOLS because the variables in Eqs. 1 and 2 contain a stochastic trend
(Table 1). The number of lags and leads is chosen using the Bayesian information cri-
terion (BIC). The coefficients estimated by DOLS represent the long-run cointegrating
relation among variables. It is worth mentioning that DOLS increases the efficiency
and reduces the small sample bias relative to the OLS estimator, while DOLS gener-
ates asymptotically efficient estimates of the regression coefficients for variables that
cointegrate (Kaufmann and Laskowski 2005).
More specifically, when we use DOLS, we conclude that the bias in the OLS esti-
mate of the cointegrating relation affects the tests of the symmetry restriction. The
symmetry restriction cannot be rejected at the 5 or 10% level for any of the two oil
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segments (wholesale and retail).14 Similar results can be depicted when testing for
exchange rate asymmetry in the wholesale level whereas the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected at any level of statistical significance. Lastly, when we simultaneously test
the equality of all short-run parameters of the same lags in the wholesale level the
null hypothesis (equality hypothesis) cannot be rejected in all sub-periods suggesting
the existence of symmetric retail price responses to changes in the spot (wholesale)
price. Based on the above analysis, we conclude that the bias in the OLS estimate for
the cointegrating relations probably is responsible for the lack of an asymmetric price
response.
Much of the recent literature is devoted not to simply testing for asymmetries but
rather attempts to explain why these markets generate asymmetries. The most com-
monly used explanations include the exercise of market power by oil companies and
the existence of consumers search costs. However, despite common belief and an
explanation linking concentration to the asymmetry between variations in crude oil
and gasoline prices, there does not appear to be much evidence of monopolisation in
any stage of the Greek gasoline market (wholesale and retail segment).15 As stated
above, the market share claimed by the four largest oil companies in Greece in 2005
(58.4%), as well as a relatively low HHI of 1.086, indicates that gasoline distribution
in the wholesale segment is competitive when viewed at the national level. The the-
ory of market power also seems difficult to exist in the retail sector. More specifically,
given the large number of retail gasoline stations (8.500 retailers) makes complete mo-
nopolisation unlikely. However, in rural areas and small towns, regional monopolies
could exist and gasoline stations have often been cited as examples of monopolistic
competition (Brown and Yucel 2000). In this case, the government could carefully
monitor the evolution of prices in these areas and ensure that filling stations operators
do not abuse their dominant position.
Except market power, consumer search costs are another possible explanation for
the existence of asymmetric response of retail gasoline prices to changes in the whole-
sale price (see Borenstein et al. 1997; Borenstein 1991; Radchenko 2005; Peltzman
2000). According to the search cost theory, each filling station has a locational monop-
oly which is limited by consumer search. When wholesale prices rise, the owner of
each station acts to increase profit margins and quickly passes the increase to final
consumers. On the contrary, when prices fall each station temporarily boosts its profit
margins by slowly passing the decrease on to consumers. Only after the consumers
engage in a costly and time-consuming search to find the lowest prices are the fill-
ing stations operators forced to lower prices to a competitive level. According to this
theory, volatile crude oil prices create a signal-extraction problem for consumers; it
encourages consumers to search less thus making gasoline filling station operators
less competitive (Radchenko 2005).
Finally, beyond market power and search costs, economists have offered numer-
ous possible explanations for the asymmetric response of gasoline prices to move-
ments in crude oil prices. Alternative explanations include markups that vary over
14 All symmetry tests were evaluated against a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom.
15 The reverse outcome holds for the refining stage, since there are only two refining companies (Hellenic
Petroleum S.A and MOTOR OIL S.A.) in Greece and imports of petroleum products are still limited.
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the business cycle, consumer response to changing prices, inventory management,
accounting practices and refinery adjustment costs (Brown and Yucel 2000). Despite
the crucial importance of the relevant topic to pursue policy objectives, no one—to the
best of our knowledge—has performed formal econometric tests that would allow the
testing of the various explanations for price asymmetry in Greece against the available
data. Therefore as stated in the comprehensive survey of Brown and Yucel (2000),
in the absence of such empirical tests, economic theory can be used as a guide to
investigate the determinants of the price asymmetric responses of gasoline.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
The relevant empirical study uses an updated monthly dataset (1988–2006) to carry
out a detailed investigation of gasoline market in Greece. For this purpose, we distin-
guish the process of transmission of oil price shocks to gasoline prices into two parts
corresponding to a first wholesale level and then to a second distribution stage (retail
level). By doing so, we are able to assess possible asymmetries at either one or both
levels. In the specific study, we used two asymmetric ECMs at each market segment in
order to distinguish between asymmetries arising from short-lived deviations in input
prices (crude oil and spot prices) and asymmetries concerning the speed at which the
gasoline price reverts to its long-run (equilibrium) level. Moreover, we allow for an
explicit role of the exchange rate and a detailed competition analysis to which rather
scant attention has been paid by the earlier studies.
On average over the estimation period, spot prices of gasoline register a well deter-
mined response to increases (or devaluations) in the drachma dollar exchange rate.
This evidence suggests that refineries are generally reluctant to transfer to consumers
those price reductions which originate from favourable movements in exchange rates.
Furthermore, from the relevant findings we conclude that after the deregulation of the
oil market, departures from the long-run equilibrium do not appear so “permanent”
compared to the period prior to the opening of the market. Therefore, wholesale prices
of gasoline tend to gradually restore equilibrium after the existence of a price shock.
This might be the outcome of the gradually opening of the oil market and the appear-
ance of competition which until 1992 was regulated by the government. However,
deregulation and the stockholding regulations did not automatically lead to symmet-
rical price movements of the oil industry. This is mainly attributed to the existence of
structural distortions in all of the three relevant markets of the oil industry that hamper
the level of the effective competition.
When we divide the whole data set into two sub-samples (unregulated with old and
new stockholding regime) some interesting findings for the scope and the impact of
stockholding regulations emerge. More specifically, in the unregulated period prior
to the implementation of the existing compulsory stock obligation (1993–2002) the
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is not as rapid as in the unregulated period
with the new stockholding regime (2003–2006). The relevant coefficients have the
anticipated signs (−0.44 and −0.56, respectively). Furthermore, in the period with the
old inventory regulation mechanism the positive short-run price coefficient is lower
than its negative counterpart while the reverse holds for the second period whereas
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the coefficient of positive crude oil price shocks is larger than unity. Lastly, only in
the first period positive changes in the exchange rate do play a significant role in the
short-run variations of spot gasoline price.
According to the results of the IRF, there is an increase over the subsequent period
of the importance of crude oil price and exchange rate fluctuations to explain variations
in the gasoline price, confirming the long-run relationship found to hold among them
by the cointegration analysis. The peak response of spot price of gasoline to crude oil
price innovations occurs 5 months after the initial shock, stabilizing thereafter. This
means that an oil shock is rather than short-lived, leaving room for debate concern-
ing a possible exercise of market power by the refineries to wholesale gasoline price
changes. This might be the outcome of the rather unique market structure of the Greek
oil sector compared to other (European) countries consisting of three distinct market
segments (refineries, wholesalers and retailers) and the absence of vertical integration
especially in the wholesale segment.
From the statistical inference (Wald tests) we reach the conclusion that there
is a symmetric response of the spot prices of gasoline towards the adjustment to
the short-run responses of crude oil. The same finding can be traced when testing
for asymmetric responses of spot price to changes in the exchange rate. However
several reasons related to the market structure, the frequency of the data and the
related econometric methodology could partially explain the lack of asymmetry in the
Greek gasoline market. In the retail segment of the gasoline market, the null hypothesis
(symmetric response) is rejected for all the sub-periods confirming the existence of
asymmetric retail price responses to changes in the spot (wholesale) price. However,
when we use DOLS, we conclude that the symmetry restriction cannot be rejected for
any of the two oil segments (wholesale and retail).
Except for the possible exercise of market power by the refineries, asymmetries
in the gasoline market are likely to be the outcome of other market parameters. As
such policies to suppress asymmetric price movements are not likely to have the
anticipated results. The best policy in order to protect consumers from welfare loses
concerns the implementation of regulatory and behavioural measures as well. First
of all, the strengthening of the role of the wholesalers and the elimination of certain
barriers to entry in the oil market could provide a suitable mechanism to enhance the
level of petroleum imports in Greece. In this way, oil prices (gasoline, heating oil, light
fuel oil) should not be driven by the refineries (Platt’s quotation plus a markup). Oil
imports instead should affect the price of petroleum products in Greece. Another suit-
able policy in order to prevent the market players from the imposition of exploitative
practices (i.e. price fixing, abuse of dominant position) that hinder the level of com-
petition in all of the three market segments is linked with a thorough investigation of
mergers. Mergers in the oil sector that increase market concentration without creating
economies of scale can have anticompetitive effects and increase the market power of
the incumbents. In such cases where competition is hampered, the government should
develop a closely monitoring of the market in order to prevent the marketers from con-
certed practices. In the retail level, the Greek government could enhance the level of
competition by a further opening of the market to new entrants such as hypermarkets
or big stores and by removing certain legal or technical barriers for the establishment
of new filling stations. The industry structure in other European countries (United
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Kingdom, France and Germany) consisting of vertically integrated companies and
significant market players (hypermarkets) in the retail segment could be a useful tool
to the Greek policy makers.
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